A transatlantic perspective on 20 emerging issues in biological engineering by Wintle, Bonnie C et al.
POINT OF VIEW
A transatlantic perspective on
20 emerging issues in biological
engineering
Abstract Advances in biological engineering are likely to have substantial impacts on global society. To explore
these potential impacts we ran a horizon scanning exercise to capture a range of perspectives on the opportunities
and risks presented by biological engineering. We first identified 70 potential issues, and then used an iterative
process to prioritise 20 issues that we considered to be emerging, to have potential global impact, and to be
relatively unknown outside the field of biological engineering. The issues identified may be of interest to
researchers, businesses and policy makers in sectors such as health, energy, agriculture and the environment.
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Aims
Biological engineering is the application of ideas
and techniques from engineering to biological
systems, often with the goal of addressing ’real-
world’ problems. Recent advances in synthetic
biology, notably in gene-editing techniques,
have substantially increased our capabilities for
biological engineering, as have advances in
areas such as information technology and robot-
ics. Keeping track of the challenges and oppor-
tunities created by such advances requires a
systematic approach to gathering, assessing and
prioritising them. Horizon scanning offers one
way of filtering diverse sources of information to
seek weak signals that, when contextualised,
indicate an issue is emerging
(Amanatidou et al., 2012; Saritas and Smith,
2011). Horizon scanning can also highlight a
range of developments in their early stages, thus
helping researchers, businesses and policy-mak-
ers to plan for the future.
Forward-looking exercises of this type bring
together people from different fields to explore
the possible implications of one field of study on
another. For example, after identifying that very
few conservation practitioners had even heard of
synthetic biology in 2012, scientists from both
disciplines convened in 2013 to explore how syn-
thetic biology and conservation would shape the
future of nature (Redford et al., 2013). In the
same year, a horizon scan of emerging issues of
interest to the conservation community
(Sutherland et al., 2014) flagged the use of
gene-editing to control invasive species or dis-
ease vectors. Since then, CRISPR/Cas9
approaches to controlling disease-carrying mos-
quitos (Adelman and Tu, 2016) and invasive
species (Esvelt et al., 2014) have rapidly gained
traction. This is not to suggest that such devel-
opments or applications are a product of being
previously raised in horizon scanning activities,
but that bringing an issue to the attention of the
community early – before it becomes well known
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– allows sufficient time to develop strategies for
researching or managing the potential risks and
opportunities accompanying these innovations.
As with any attempt to anticipate future
trends, we acknowledge that the more specula-
tive projections may not come to pass. Some
technological hurdles may never be cleared,
unexpected breakthroughs may change the
direction of research, and some directions may
be deemed too risky to pursue. We also recog-
nise that providing a snapshot of such a broad
range of issues comes at the expense of depth,
so here we attempt only to provide a digestible
summary and launching point for others to fur-
ther explore those issues that may be relevant to
them. For each issue outlined here, we aim to
summarize possible implications for society,
including questions, risks and opportunities.
How might an exercise such as this prove use-
ful in the future? Outputs of similarly structured
horizon scanning activities in Antarctic science
(Kennicutt et al., 2014) have underpinned road-
maps outlining the enabling technologies,
access to the region, logistics and infrastructure,
and international cooperation (Kennicutt et al.,
2016) required to “deliver the science”. These
have since been used to guide investment of
national programs (National Academies, 2015).
Similarly, the Natural Environment Research
Council in the UK has drawn on annual horizon
scans in conservation (see, for example,
Sutherland et al., 2014) to inform their strategic
planning. While a single horizon scan is only a
first step in navigating the way forward (ideally,
it would be followed with further exercises to
map out how an agency might act in light of the
information), we hope that the output of this
scan may also be a useful starting point for
developing policy designs.
Prioritising a set of issues for attention is an
inherently subjective process, and reflects the
perspectives and experiences of the people car-
rying out the assessment, as well as the dynam-
ics of the group. This underscores the
importance of bringing together a group that
represents a wide range of perspectives. The
main strength of this exercise is that the issues
are systematically and democratically canvassed
and prioritised by a relatively diverse group
using structured elicitation and aggregation
methods designed to mitigate some social psy-
chological biases (Burgman, 2015), rather than
reflecting the perspective of a single expert.
Although we have attempted to capture an
assortment of backgrounds, expertise, agendas
and demographics (including age, gender and
career stage), we acknowledge that this article
presents the perspectives of researchers based
in the UK and US.
Procedure
We followed a structured procedure developed
by Sutherland et al. (Sutherland et al., 2011) to
solicit, discuss and prioritise candidate issues
(Figure 1). The method shares features of the
Delphi technique (Linstone and Turoff, 1975),
in that the scoring of issues is anonymous and
iterative. It also draws on the collective wisdom
of a group, while affording individuals opportu-
nity to give private judgements, and to revise
them in light of information and reasoning pro-
vided by others.
The horizon scan comprised a set of partici-
pants blending academic, industry, innovation,
security, and policy expertise related to biologi-
cal engineering, with a range of backgrounds in
natural sciences, engineering, social sciences,
and humanities. Each of the 27 participants (the
authors minus facilitators) submitted short sum-
maries of 2-5 ‘issues’ that they considered to be
on the horizon in biological engineering, and
that have the potential to substantially impact
global society. Participants also consulted their
colleagues and networks for suggestions.
For submitted issues to be comparable with
each other, they need to be framed at similar
levels of granularity. Issues that are very broad,
such as ’regulation of bioengineering’, will
encompass a whole suite of more detailed
issues, so typically score higher than a single,
highly specific issue. But these broad topics
rarely make good horizon scanning issues, as
they tend to be already well known, and are too
vague to inform decision-making. To help ensure
that issues were submitted with an appropriate
level of granularity, an example topic was circu-
lated that was framed at five different scales.
The example was built around ’dual-use’ scien-
tific research (that is, research on materials or
technologies that can be used to both benefit
and harm humanity). As a general topic, dual-
use research would be too broad for inclusion
(Level 1). Likewise, a recent symposium hosted
by the National Academies in the US
(National Academies, 2016a) discussing a mor-
atorium on ’gain of function’ research (which is a
type of dual-use research) was considered too
narrow as a standalone issue (Level 5). A possi-
ble mid-point example (Level 3) would be the
changing regulation of gain-of-function experi-
ments, illustrated through the current US
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moratorium on such research and related delib-
erative processes (such as the symposium hosted
by the National Academies). Participants were
asked to submit issues framed to approximate
Level 3 granularity.
After merging duplicates, a total of 70 issue
summaries were anonymized and circulated to
all participants, who individually scored each
issue according to its suitability (1-1000) as a
horizon scanning issue. Suitability reflects a com-
bination of plausibility, novelty, and potential
impact on society in the medium to longer term
future (up to 20 years, as a guide). Assessing
potential impact on society is, of course, com-
plex. Impacts might manifest via more direct or
obvious effects, for example, on the environ-
ment or healthcare. But they may also arise indi-
rectly, via impacts on funding, research,
innovation and regulation of either the products
or the practice of biological engineering. Those
that profoundly influence the speed or direction
in which biological engineering advances will, in
turn, impact society. In their score sheets, partic-
ipants also indicated whether they had already
‘heard of’ each issue.
The first round scores were converted to
standardised Z scores. That is, the mean and
standard deviation of each individual’s set of
scores were first calculated, then each item-
score in the set was standardised by subtracting
the mean and dividing by the standard devia-
tion. The resulting Z scores retain information
about the distribution of magnitudes in the
suitability scores and can be meaningfully aggre-
gated across participants who have provided
sets of scores with different means and varian-
ces. To explore divergence in scores across con-
tributors, we analysed the inter-rater
concordance of raw scores from Round 1 with
Kendall’s W, and the rank correlation between
individual participants with Spearman’s rho.
Issues in the original long list were ranked
according to the average Z scores. Based on
feedback during first-round scoring, one issue
describing two distinct innovations was split into
two, and two pairs of similar issues were each
combined into one. Before finalising our short
list of top-scoring issues, participants were given
the opportunity to save issues that were about
to be eliminated, if they wished to see them fur-
ther discussed. Two issues were retained at this
step, and one further issue was added later. A
resulting short list of 34 remaining issues was
taken forward for further discussion at the
workshop.
Prior to the workshop, participants were each
assigned 3–4 issues to investigate in more
depth: this aim of this stage was to gather evi-
dence to help assess whether the issue in ques-
tion was sufficiently plausible, novel and
consequential to warrant inclusion in the final
list. Each of the shortlisted issues had 2–3 inves-
tigators assigned to it, who were generally not
experts in that particular topic nor the person
who submitted the issue. This meant that work-
shop discussion could include the person who
submitted the topic, others who were already
knowledgeable in the area, and the 2–3 people
who had been assigned the topic, so allowing a
more informed discussion.
In the workshop, convened in Cambridge,
UK, in November 2016, participants systemati-
cally discussed each issue in turn. They were
prompted to consider how well known the issue
already was (based on the percentage of partici-
pants who had heard of it), what was novel
about the issue, together with particular chal-
lenges and opportunities it presented. After
working through each issue, participants individ-
ually and confidentially scored its suitability for a
second time. At the end of the workshop, the 20
top-scoring issues (based on Z scores) were pre-
sented to participants for a final discussion. One
issue was considered to be an example of
another, and so was merged, allowing inclusion
of the 21st-ranking issue in the final list. Another
issue (‘brain–machine interfaces’) was considered
to be outside the scope of ‘biological engineer-
ing’, so participants voted to swap it with a
Figure 1. Horizon scanning. The seven stages of the horizon scanning procedure
(Sutherland et al., 2011) used to identify emerging issues in biological engineering.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.30247.002
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slightly lower ranked issue. The final list of issues
is reported below, roughly grouped according
to their relevance in the near (< 5 years), inter-
mediate (5-10 years), and longer (> 10 years)
terms. ’Relevance’ is a subjective and fuzzy mea-
sure and could be determined by any number of
factors, such as whether the issue is considered
underway, established, or at a tipping point by
the indicated year. Applying criteria such as
these is difficult for issues that are composed of
multiple elements. So here, ’relevance’ refers to
how directly, and by extension, how soon the
overall issue could measurably interact with risks
to society. We endeavour to give a balanced
view of both the risks and opportunities pre-
sented by each issue.
Issues most relevant in the near
term (< 5 years)
Artificial photosynthesis and carbon
capture for producing biofuels
There is a growing need to capture carbon and
harness energy from sunlight in order to reduce
the environmental impacts of fossil fuel combus-
tion and methane release from large-animal agri-
culture. This would also enable production of
fuels, plastics and chemicals from pollutants.
Biology-based methods of carbon capture
include using bioreactors to catalyse the produc-
tion of fuels in fermentation bioreactors (Patent
20150247171, Lanzatech, NZ), or creating ‘artifi-
cial photosynthesis’ that uses solar energy to
drive an electrochemical reduction of CO2 to
methanol (Ager, 2016). New research is focused
on combining inorganic and biological systems
to boost efficiency. For example, a ‘bionic leaf’
in which inorganic catalysts are interfaced with
the bacterium Ralstonia eutropha is able to pro-
duce biomass and liquid fusel alcohols at carbon
reduction efficiencies that exceed the rate
achieved by photosynthesis in terrestrial plants
(Liu et al., 2016). A hybrid nanowire-bacterial
system for fixing CO2 at high efficiencies has
also been reported (Liu et al., 2015). Their
hybrid approach, interfacing biological and inor-
ganic systems, is scalable and might maximize
the overall performance of chemical synthesis
pathways. Such developments might contribute
to the future adoption of carbon capture sys-
tems, and provide sustainable sources of com-
modity chemicals and fuel. However, the
challenge of matching carbon flux to photon flux
and managing both catalytic and biological com-
ponents at large scale must still be overcome.
Enhanced photosynthesis for agricultural
productivity
Rapid population growth, accompanied by a
changing climate, represents one of the major
challenges of our time. In order to feed an
expected world population of more than nine bil-
lion people in 2050, agricultural productivity will
need to more than double in the face of shrinking
croplands (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012).
Instead, growth in agricultural productivity of the
most important food crops has been stagnating
(Ray et al., 2012). The large gains in yield of the
Green Revolution were primarily driven by
increases in biomass partition into grain (harvest
index), which is now near the theoretical upper
limit. The so-called yield gap (the difference
between possible and achieved yield) remains to
be closed as well. To avoid further land conver-
sion to farming, yields on currently farmed land
need to be increased. Reducing pre-harvest
losses, for example those caused by disease, as
well as reducing post-harvest and post-consumer
waste, will also help address food security. A
promising approach to significantly boosting
crop yields is to enhance photosynthesis. This has
been discussed for some time, but synthetic biol-
ogy is now providing the techniques to achieve it
(Furbank et al., 2015). For example, an attempt
is underway to increase yield potential by engi-
neering a more efficient type of photosynthesis
known as C4 into rice (http://photosynthome.irri.
org/C4rice/). Models show that increased water
and nitrogen use efficiencies from this engineer-
ing effort could result in yield increases of 30% to
50% (Karki et al., 2013). Synthetic biology tech-
niques have enabled us to re-engineer entire
microbial genomes (Hutchison et al., 2016), and
efforts are underway to design synthetic chloro-
plast genomes in a similar manner (Scharff and
Bock, 2014). In the future, engineered chloro-
plasts may encode functions for improved photo-
synthetic capture and conversion of light and
carbon dioxide (Ort et al., 2015).
New approaches to synthetic gene drives
The potential of gene drives (via the supra-Men-
delian inheritance of an introduced trait) for
modulating the insect vectors of human diseases
such as malaria, West Nile Virus and Zika, has
been widely recognised and much discussed
(National Academies, 2016b). Gene drives are
also being considered for restoring ecosystems
by, for example, eliminating introduced preda-
tors from islands. They aim to increase the effi-
ciency of existing ’non-drive’ methods that
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employ a similar concept of reducing population
viability (e.g. by releasing male sterile insects
into the environment), but that require repeat
treatments. With the gene drive approach, the
linked trait propagates to additional generations
to more rapidly permeate the population,
potentially spreading through the entire species.
This raises questions about how deploying gene
drives in wild populations might alter ecosys-
tems, disrupting trophic levels and food webs,
and creating vacant niches (for example, for new
disease vector species or new disease organ-
isms). Gene drives create risks that might be
unpalatable even when balanced against the
potential to reduce the number of lives lost to
transmittable diseases. New innovations are
therefore being developed to control their
genetic reach (Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, 2016a).
One approach is to include ’kill switches’, such
as identification markers or in-built susceptibili-
ties to specific treatments or chemicals, which
could be used to control the engineered popula-
tion (Akbari et al., 2015; DiCarlo et al., 2015). A
more complex proposition is to intrinsically self-
limit the gene drive by deploying it as a ’daisy
drive’ in which the components of the gene drive
are split into smaller, genetically-unlinked units
that would eventually segregate in the popula-
tion, inactivating the drive (Smidler, 2016).
Until gene drives have societal permission,
their legal and regulated use will likely be
restricted to proof-of-concept studies on con-
fined laboratory populations and perhaps lim-
ited contained field trials. Given the current
public and political debate, together with prog-
ress on alternative approaches to disease control
(e.g. limiting the ability of mosquitos to transmit
disease by release of Wolbachia-infected mos-
quitoes, release of genetically engineered sterile
male insects, or the development of vaccines), it
is still unclear whether gene drive techniques
would become the technique of choice for dis-
ease control. The improvements in control of
gene drives described here may increase the
likelihood of such techniques being permitted,
but uncertainty around the environmental
impacts and the practical need for the technol-
ogy may still render the risks unacceptable. For
example, the Broad Institute prohibits its CRISPR
technology to be used for gene drives, sterile
seeds or tobacco products for human use
(https://www.broadinstitute.org/news/licensing-
crispr-agriculture-policy-considerations).
Human genome editing
Genome editing technologies are accelerating
our understanding of whole human genomes
and individual genetic elements alike. Beyond
basic research, many states have now taken
steps to enable therapeutic genome editing in
human somatic cells, and others have shown a
willingness to directly modify human embryos
for medical research (Kang et al., 2016a;
Liang et al., 2015). Genome engineering tech-
nologies like CRISPR/Cas9 offer the possibility
to improve human lifespans and health, recently
being shown in human embryos to repair dis-
ease-causing mutations (Ma et al., 2017). How-
ever, their implementation poses major
sociopolitical and ethical dilemmas. The ques-
tion of inheritable, human germline editing
grows increasingly relevant as more genome
editing methods emerge (Yang et al., 2014),
safe precedents are demonstrated in mammals,
and somatic trials begin (Reardon, 2016).
Due to different levels of acceptance among
individuals and worldviews, it is unlikely that there
will be a universally agreed boundary between
genome editing for preventative or therapeutic
medicine and editing that aims for human
genome perfection, or even enhancement. As
knowledge about the genetics of increasingly
subtle and complex human attributes accumu-
lates, it is feasible that parents or states with the
financial and technological means may elect to
provide strategic advantages to future genera-
tions. For example, one Chinese leader previ-
ously stated that their government would use all
means available to improve the health of the pop-
ulation, including direct genetic modification of
its citizens (Carlson, 2012). With limited interna-
tional discourse on individual and collective rights
to genome editing, non-uniform use or regulation
of the technology could transform social mobility
and international order in unpredictable ways. As
the technology advances, policymakers will need
to work closely with regulators, biotechnology
companies and healthcare providers to ensure
that both somatic and germline human genome
editing follows agreed ethical guidelines under-
pinned by extensive discourse.
Accelerating defense agency research in
biological engineering
The US Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) invested $110 million in syn-
thetic biology in 2014, which accounted for
almost 60% of funding for synthetic biology in
the US that year, and this figure increases to
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67% when other Department of Defense funding
is included (Kuiken, 2015). The UK Defence Sci-
ence and Technology Laboratory has also
invested in synthetic biology, albeit on a smaller
scale, and mainly focussed on developing novel
materials (DSTL, 2016). Defense agencies report
that they are investing in these programs with a
view to preventing or responding to particular
threats. However, areas in which some agencies
are investing (e.g. agriculture, gene drives,
chemical production) could raise both public
perception issues and have dual-use potentials.
For example, DARPA’s Insect Allies Program
intends to use insects to disseminate engineered
plant viruses that confer traits to the target
plants they feed on (Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, 2016b), with the
aim of protecting crops from potential plant
pathogens. However, it is plausible that such
technologies could be used by others to harm
targets. Many ongoing military-funded bioengi-
neering projects appear to focus on potential
dual-use technologies (Reardon, 2015) and
need to be carefully taken into account by regu-
lators, as well as by funders, in order to avoid a
security dilemma known as the ‘spiral model’.
This is where efforts to anticipate and counter
adversary capabilities with engineered biological
systems may actually produce those capabilities,
justifying increased biodefense research and
amplifying tensions (Jervis, 1978). Research pro-
grams will also need to be evaluated against var-
ious international agreements including the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,
Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
and the Convention on Biological Diversity,
which may require renegotiations to incorporate
the rapidly changing technologies and proposed
uses resulting from these programs.
Issues most relevant in the
intermediate term (5-10 years)
Regenerative medicine: 3D printing body
parts and tissue engineering
Tissue engineers have already built or grown
transplantable bladders, hip joints, vaginas,
windpipes, veins, arteries, ears, skin, the menis-
cus of the knee, and patches for damaged hearts
(Ghorbani et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2017;
Naito et al., 2014). Several scientific fields are
coalescing to accelerate the development of
methods to construct tissue. Would-be organ
engineers can now use custom-designed 3D
printers to position cells accurately on organ-
shaped scaffolds (Wang et al., 2016a), like parts
in the chassis of a car. Complementing this tech-
nology, a technique known as whole-organ
decellularization can create scaffolds ready for
implanted cells while preserving the native tissue
architecture (Peloso et al., 2015). Living cells
printed on to structures have been implanted
into animals and have matured into functional
tissues (Kang et al., 2016b). As this technology
advances, more ailments will be treatable, and,
eventually, age-related degradation of various
body systems may be reversible. While this tech-
nology will undoubtedly ease suffering caused
by traumatic injuries and a myriad of illnesses
that lead to organ failure, reversing the decay
associated with age is fraught with ethical, social
and economic concerns. Current healthcare sys-
tems would rapidly become overburdened by
the cost of replenishing body parts of citizens as
they age. If governments cannot afford costly
therapies to ward off old age in all its citizens,
new socioeconomic classes may emerge, as only
those who can pay for such care themselves can
extend their healthy years.
Microbiome-based therapies
The human microbiome is implicated in a large
number of human disorders, from Parkinson’s to
colon cancer (Sampson et al., 2016), as well as
metabolic conditions such as obesity and type 2
diabetes (Hartstra et al., 2015). At present,
interventions to manipulate the microbiome
composition of humans are limited to rather
crude approaches, such as probiotic and prebi-
otic diets and fecal transplants. However, syn-
thetic biology approaches could greatly
accelerate the development of more effective
microbiota-based therapeutics (Sheth et al.,
2016). For example, genetically engineered bac-
terial strains or consortia of natural and engi-
neered microorganisms could be introduced to,
or used to supplement, the host microbiome in
cell-based therapies designed to prevent infec-
tion, resolve inflammation or treat metabolic dis-
orders (Mimee et al., 2016). Engineered phage-
based strategies may also prove useful in sub-
tractive therapies aimed at targeting pathogens
or shaping host-associated bacterial populations
(Citorik et al., 2014). Among the regulatory
challenges posed by these approaches is the
possibility that DNA from genetically engineered
microbes may spread to endogenous members
of the microbiota through natural horizontal
gene transfer, which is prevalent in the human
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microbiome. Another concern is the uninten-
tional colonization of others through escape of
engineered organisms into the environment. A
dialogue between researchers, clinicians and
regulators to develop a coordinated regulatory
framework for patient safety and environmental
issues is needed to advance clinical research and
translation of synthetic biology approaches to
real-world microbiota-based therapies.
Producing vaccines and human therapies in
plants
Today, the majority of influenza vaccines are
produced in embryonated chicken eggs in a six-
month process, before which scientists must pre-
dict which strains will be dominant (Milia´n and
Kamen, 2015). In 2014/2015, the vaccine was
announced to be only 23% effective in the USA
because the dominant virus had been incorrectly
predicted and was not included in the vaccine
development process (Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention et al., 2015). The ability of
plant platforms to rapidly respond to large-scale
demand and emerging disease threats was first
demonstrated in 2012, when DARPA issued a
challenge to produce 10 million doses of the
H1N1 flu vaccine within one month of receipt of
an emailed genetic sequence. The Canadian
company Medicago successfully responded
using a wild-relative of tobacco for production
(Lomonossoff and D’Aoust, 2016). The leaves
of this cheap-to-grow plant are used in produc-
tion runs of less than a week, requiring just
water, light and the DNA template for the prod-
uct of interest as inputs (Sack et al., 2015).
Plants can now be tailored to produce proteins
with human-like post-translational modifications
as well as a range of other molecules used as
human therapies that are prohibitively expensive
or difficult to produce in other systems, widen-
ing the range of therapies that could be pro-
duced in plants (Li et al., 2016). The 2012
approval of Elelyso (Protalix) for commercial use
in humans to treat Gaucher’s disease has paved
the way (Mor, 2015) for a number of therapeu-
tics and vaccines targeting conditions ranging
from influenza to non-Hodgkins lymphoma
(Holtz et al., 2015). This widened scope and
accumulation of examples and successes signals
a shift toward rapidly deployed, industrial scale
plant-based production of new therapies for
emerging diseases, which will require an equally
responsive regulatory landscape for testing and
deployment.
Manufacturing illegal drugs using
engineered organisms
Advances in the engineering of microbial metab-
olism have led to the development of microbial
strains capable of producing a wide range of
complex molecules from sugar. These advances
enable the fermentative production of drugs
that would otherwise be produced chemically or
isolated from wild-type organisms. A notable
example of this is yeast engineered to produce
opiates (Galanie et al., 2015). Although yields
are currently insufficient for the isolation of sig-
nificant quantities of products (Endy et al.,
2015), it is anticipated that future advances may
make fermentation not only a viable alternative
to plant and chemistry based supply chains, but
also attractive for criminal manufacture and
abuse. The barrier to entry for fermentation is
relatively low, and only a few cells are required
to start a new culture. Thus the dissemination of
engineered strains beyond academia and indus-
try into groups operating outside state and
international regulations could mark a sea
change in both drug production and access
(Oye et al., 2015). The unlicensed production of
legal drugs by these means may result in
cheaper, but possibly less pure, alternatives to
licensed products (e.g. pharmaceuticals). Addi-
tionally, fermentative production of illicit drugs
might enable small-scale, local manufacture that
disrupts and undermines existing transit routes
and organized crime networks. Or, technologies
and individuals with appropriate expertise could
possibly be incorporated into existing criminal
networks. The potential for illegal use of these
technologies will ensure that calls for their con-
trol and prohibition will continue (Oye et al.,
2015).
Reassigning codons as genetic firewalls
Whole-genome synthesis projects are underway
in bacteria and yeast that may realise new, engi-
neered microbes that only partially recognise
the standard genetic code (Ostrov et al., 2016;
Wang et al., 2016b). An Escherichia coli
genome has been modified to no longer use
one of the 64 codons normally recognised in
protein synthesis: the cells containing this
genome can instead use this free codon to pro-
grammably insert non-standard amino acids with
alternative physical and chemical properties into
proteins, while still translating the original pro-
tein repertoire required for growth (Lajoie et al.,
2013). Codon reassignment offers attractive
opportunities for industrial use, as cells can have
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new chemistries added to their proteins and in
doing so produce novel functional biomaterials
or enzymes capable of new types of catalysis. It
is currently aimed at ‘stop’ codons in the natural
sequences, but could also be used to reassign
amino acid-encoding alternative codons, in
which case it could also create a genetic “fire-
wall” where natural genes are no longer cor-
rectly converted into proteins when placed in
the engineered cells. This reduces the suscepti-
bility of the recoded organism to horizontal
gene transfer from surrounding microbes or
from attack by phage. While this is especially
desirable for stability in industrial systems, it
raises the possibility of creating invulnerable
microbes that could grow unchecked in natural
ecosystems. However, recoded cells can be lim-
ited to controlled conditions: by encoding the
incorporation of a non-standard amino acid into
essential genes, the cell is dependent on the
supply of this amino acid for survival and will die
in any environment where this is not provided
(Mandell et al., 2015; Rovner et al., 2015).
Recoded organisms thus present a new issue in
biosafety: they have been intentionally designed
to be less likely to interact with natural organ-
isms but, in doing so, hold the potential to
become an ecological competitor if not appro-
priately controlled. Genetically firewalled cells
represent the gold standard for intrinsic contain-
ment, yet also a major challenge for existing
regulation.
Rise of automated tools for biological
design, test and optimisation
The process of designing, testing and optimizing
biological systems needs to become more effi-
cient. Automation has been applied with great
success to the design, test and manufacturing
processes used in, for example, the automotive,
aerospace and electronics industries. However,
the engineering of organisms is not yet per-
formed at similar scales. Automated fabrication
with biological materials and the subsequent
characterization of engineered materials and
cells is now establishing itself in the form of serv-
ices provided by ‘biofactories’ in a number of
universities and companies (Check Hayden,
2014). Currently, the majority of laboratory
automation is based around the use of existing
tools and technologies, automating previously
manually-executed protocols for design, simula-
tion, building and testing. The next wave of lab
automation will extend this, shifting experts’
focus from the minutiae of organism design and
construction to a more abstract functional view;
artificial intelligence-based software will auto-
matically design and analyse experiments; and
lab work will be performed by technicians or
robots as instructed by the software. Hence,
these tools make it possible to interrogate
increasingly large experimental spaces rapidly
and cheaply. This underlying technology will
speed up the process to discover new molecules
or prototype new applications fostering the
development of many bio-based products. It will
reduce the specialist skills needed for design,
fabrication and validation and, along with out-
sourced fabrication, open up opportunities for
countries with lesser biotechnology capabilities
to take advantage of the booming bioeconomy.
More broadly, the imminent arrival of “design
for manufacturing” for bioengineered systems is
likely to rapidly improve the ability of biomanu-
facturing to compete against traditional
manufacturing industries (Carlson, 2016;
Sadowski et al., 2016). The resulting accelera-
tion of bioengineering will also impact the regu-
latory system as the complexity and rate of
submissions rises.
Biology as an information science: Impacts
on global governance
The ability to chemically synthesise or ‘write’
DNA molecules at low cost means the inherent
value of any given DNA sequence lies increas-
ingly in information about its function or the
function of any product it encodes rather than in
a physical sample of the organism from which
that sequence originated. Genetic information
can now be accessed online and exploited in a
remote location without engaging with compli-
cated export/import procedures or material
transfer agreements. While the use (and misuse)
of genetic information historically required the
transportation of specimens, today’s biological
engineers increasingly order the de novo synthe-
sis of any DNA sequences that they wish to use
from a commercial provider, using the sequence
resources held in online databases as the tem-
plate. Moreover, it is now possible to travel with
a hand-held sequencer and to go from sample
to sequence in less than 24 hours (Quick et al.,
2016) negating the need to transport samples
back to the laboratory to obtain the necessary
genetic information. The enormous benefits of
this rapid online transmission and synthesis of
genetic information are already being realized,
for example, through the production of ten mil-
lion doses of vaccine just a month after receipt
of an email containing the sequence of the viral
strain (Powell, 2015). However, current
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practices and guidelines for governing access,
privacy and benefit sharing from the use of
genetic resources, such as the Nagoya Protocol
(see below), are still predominantly focused
on physical samples, increasing the potential for
biopiracy.
Intersection of information security and
bio-automation
Biological engineering puts genetic information
at the heart of an iterative design-build-test
cycle for genetically modified organisms.
Advancements in automation technology com-
bined with faster and more reliable engineering
techniques have resulted in the emergence of
robotic ’cloud labs’ where digital information is
transformed into DNA then expressed in some
target organisms with very high-throughput and
decreasing human oversight. This increased reli-
ance on bio-automation and ingestion of digital
information from multiple sources opens the
possibility of new kinds of information security
threats. These could include: tampering with
digital DNA sequences leading to production of
harmful organisms by researchers who are
unaware of the malicious changes; sabotaging
vaccine and drug production through attacks on
critical DNA sequence databases or equipment;
using DNA as a ’Trojan horse’ to carry out a digi-
tal attack. The latter scenario was recently simu-
lated by researchers from the University of
Washington, who successfully engineered a
DNA sequence to exploit a vulnerability they
introduced into DNA sequencing software
(Ney, 2017).
Information security is arguably a well-recog-
nised threat so one might question why it is a
horizon scanning issue. Emerging digital DNA
tools and services present clear potential for
new forms and sources of risk as DNA is directly
’executable’ and verification methods such as
sequencing can themselves be hacked, hamper-
ing efforts to assure quality and consistency.
Recent experiences with ’internet-of-things devi-
ces’ suggest that security does not always
receive sufficient attention when a new technol-
ogy is undergoing rapid development and
increased decentralisation (Department of
Homeland Security, 2016). Since bio-automa-
tion is currently undergoing such development
and decentralisation, we propose that informa-
tion security qualifies as an issue and that routes
to tackling it should be explored as a priority.
These might include setting information security
standards for the bioindustry, such as ensuring
strong encryption and quality control for all bio-
automation, recognizing public bioinformatics
databases as critical infrastructure, and further
engagement with information security experts
when implementing tools and services.
Effects of the Nagoya protocol on
biological engineering
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization
(Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010), a
supplementary agreement to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), entered into force in
2014. It is expected to change the way genetic
materials are treated by countries that are signa-
tory to the protocol (93 at the time of writing).
While many countries are still formulating
national legislation and implementation plans,
some countries rich in biodiversity (so-called pro-
vider countries) have already taken legislative
steps to restrict access to physical and digital
genetic resources originating from within their
borders (Bagley and Rai, 2013; Man-
heim, 2016). Should the Nagoya Protocol be
extended to associated data (such as genetic
sequence information), it will substantially affect
the collection, handling and transfer of such
data which is used extensively in biological engi-
neering. ‘Digital Sequence Information of
Genetic Resources’ was discussed at a CBD
meeting in December 2016 (the COP13 meet-
ing) and recognised to be a cross-cutting issue
(Convention on Biological Diversity, 2016).
The decision was made to establish an Ad Hoc
Technical Expert Group to compile relevant
views and information, and a fact-finding and
scoping study will likely be considered at the
COP14 meeting. Regulatory uncertainty, restric-
tive terms set by provider countries, and limited
capacity to deal with requests may slow down
future research and its commercialization. In
response, new programmes coordinating
exchange of genetic resources may be imple-
mented, potentially requiring an international
system for tracking the origin of a genetic
resource. Amidst its practical challenges, the
developments discussed in ’Biology as an infor-
mation science’ (above) underscore the impor-
tance of maintaining the spirit of the Nagoya
Protocol, for its potential to reduce
inequality among countries and promote eco-
logical sustainability by creating an incentive to
preserve potentially valuable sources of genetic
material.
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Corporate espionage and biocrime
Cutting-edge biotechnology is associated with a
range of concerns about criminal misuse. Emer-
gent bioeconomies will face many of the same
hazards and vulnerabilities as more established
sectors due to the high cost of biotechnology
product development. The comparatively
demanding regulatory environment in areas such
as food and health may make the field particu-
larly susceptible to both corporate espionage
and the emergence of counterfeit markets. In a
recent example, one of six Chinese nationals
charged by the US Government pleaded guilty
for attempting to steal trade secrets from GM
seed companies (Waltz, 2016). Beyond theft of
physical samples, the information-centric charac-
ter of modern biotechnology entails increased
risk of cybercrimes such as data theft and extor-
tion (Evans and Selgelid, 2015). Underground
trading already exists for recreational drugs,
medicines, and crop seeds (Tatge, 2004). With
continuing expansion of the biotech industry
and increasing accessibility of both biological
information and genetic engineering techniques
to non-specialists, bio-piracy will likely become
more widespread in the future.
Issues most relevant in the longer
term (>10 years)
Newmakers disrupt pharmaceutical
markets
Currently, many medicinal compounds are either
chemically synthesized or extracted directly from
the source organism, often a plant that is diffi-
cult to cultivate. These processes can be com-
plex and costly, requiring specialized facilities.
Recent advances have seen biosynthetic path-
ways for several human therapies re-engineered
into yeast (for example, the analgesic hydroco-
done (Galanie et al., 2015), the anti-malarial
artemisinin (Paddon et al., 2013), and strictosi-
dine, from which the chemotherapeutic agents
vinblastine and vincristine are derived
(Brown et al., 2015)). Additionally, community
bio-labs and entrepreneurial start-ups around
the world are customizing and diffusing methods
and tools for biological experiments and engi-
neering. For example, in 2015, a biohacking
team in Oakland, California, secured crowd-
funding to develop an open source protocol for
making inexpensive generic insulin from E. coli
(Stelzer, 2016). Alternative low-cost production
systems combined with open business models
and open source technologies herald
opportunities for the distributed manufacturing
of therapies tailored to regional diseases that
multinational pharmaceutical companies might
not find profitable (Pauwels, 2016). This could
result in a shift toward more equitable and glob-
ally distributed pharmaceutical production,
addressing current long-standing concerns that
the pharmaceutical industry is profiteering from
genetic samples taken from developing coun-
tries without sharing benefits (World Health
Organization, 2007). However, it raises con-
cerns around the potential disruption of existing
manufacturing markets and raw material supply
chains as well as fears about inadequate regula-
tion, less rigorous product quality control, and
misuse.
Platform technologies to address
emerging disease pandemics
Emerging infectious diseases – such as the recent
Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks – and potential
biological weapons attacks require scalable, flexi-
ble diagnosis and treatment (World Health
Organization, 2016). Current methods of diag-
nosing and responding to disease tend to be tai-
lored to individual pathogens, or even individual
strains of pathogens, with little capacity to share
data or reuse systems for multiple pathogens.
These ’stovepipe’ methods of engineering (refer-
ring to separate, isolated approaches to solving
problems) are often inefficient when compared
to reusable platforms that can adapt to detect
and rapidly develop countermeasures to different
emerging infectious diseases. Such platform
technologies would greatly decrease response
time to emerging pandemics. As such, there have
been a series of recent funding calls for such plat-
forms, for example, by the World Health Organi-
zation (World Health Organization, 2016).
Platform technologies could use metagenomic
sequencing to create pathogen-blind diagnoses,
or be capable of creating a range of therapeutic
agents. Existing examples include standardized
influenza vaccine backbones for the rapid devel-
opment of vaccine candidates (Dormitzer et al.,
2013), and plant-based antibody production sys-
tems (Olinger et al., 2012), as described in ’Pro-
ducing vaccines and human therapies in plants’
above.
The value, distribution, and use of a particu-
lar platform technology is not guaranteed.
Novel technologies to combat infectious dis-
ease are insufficient solutions if a significant
portion of the population has no access to the
most basic public health and healthcare infra-
structure (Evans, 2014). Platform technologies
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may or may not be fully distributed, and there
may be restrictions on where they can operate;
for example, if plant-based production systems
have a limited climate in which they can be
grown, or require significant resources to culti-
vate. Given that global protection against
emerging infectious disease hinges on rapid,
often international action, the political and eco-
nomic barriers to the distribution of such tech-
nologies need to be addressed (Brown and
Evans, 2017).
Challenges to taxonomy-based
descriptions andmanagement of biological
risk
Today, efforts to describe and manage biorisk
are based upon taxonomic classification of the
agents involved (for example, the Australia
Group’s ’Lists of pathogens’ or the CDC’s
’Select Agent Rules’). As the life sciences
advance, the utility of these lists is diminished
due to several factors. To begin with, chimeric
and modified agents do not fit easily into such
lists. For example, a virus composed of genetic
elements from several related strains defies tax-
onomic description (e.g. is it a strain of measles
virus, rinderpest virus or canine distemper virus?)
and challenges safe handling guidelines. Sec-
ondly, and perhaps most fundamentally, it is the
presence of particular functional properties of an
agent that drive the risk, rather than the identity
of the agent itself. For example, most strains of
Bacillus cereus are harmless, but the identifica-
tion of toxigenic strains (Okinaka et al., 2006)
has prompted the US Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) to rewrite rules and
include this strain as a select agent
(US Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices, 2016). Likewise, they have had to include
at least one phenotypic definition, for Newcastle
Disease Virus. The feasibility of describing and
managing biorisk according to biological func-
tion, rather than taxonomy, has been the subject
of a long-running debate (National Academies,
2010), but is extremely relevant at a time when
many new pathogens and strains are being dis-
covered through bioprospecting, and the cur-
rent system risks overregulating harmless non-
pathogenic organisms or failing to capture dis-
tantly related pathogens with similar properties.
To ensure that biorisk management and biose-
curity regimes remain relevant into the future,
taxonomic lists would benefit from supplemen-
tary phenotypic definitions that capture the
traits that influence the strains’ biosafety or bio-
security risk.
Shifting ownership models in
biotechnology
Models of ownership in bioengineering are typi-
cally strongly vertically integrated and rely
heavily on the patenting of both tools and appli-
cations. The current market structure and supply
chain provides little access to basic bioengineer-
ing tools and technologies to those in low-
resource settings who could arguably reap the
greatest social and economic benefit from devel-
oping a sustainable bioeconomy based on local
needs and priorities (Juma and Konde, 2013).
The rise of off-patent, generic tools and the low-
ering of technical barriers for engineering biol-
ogy has the potential to change this, particularly
where new foundational advances are made
open for others to build on (Hope, 2008). This is
demonstrated in open source software and,
more relevantly, in drug discovery
(Masum, 2011). Current examples in biotechnol-
ogy include the work of New Harvest, a US non-
profit organisation that is building a library of
open source cell lines for cultured meat produc-
tion, and numerous open source providers of
open hardware that enable high-throughput
experimentation, such as the OpenTrons liquid
handling robot and DropBot digital microfluidics
system. Although platforms such as espacenet.
com and lens.org help promote transparency,
the patent landscape for engineering biology is
complex (Carbonell et al., 2016; Carlson, 2011).
Publicly available resources clarifying the status
of open source biotechnologies could provide
great benefit for enhancing the public’s return
on investment in research and in the patent sys-
tem itself. Leveraging open source biotechnolo-
gies – those that entered the public domain via
the patent system as well as those made avail-
able through legal tools such as the BioBrick
Public Agreement and OpenMTA – could facili-
tate widespread sharing of knowledge and foun-
dational tools for engineering biology
(Grewal, 2017).
Securing the critical infrastructure needed
to deliver the bioeconomy
Many governments see a thriving bioeconomy
as the basis of national prosperity in the 21st
century, and synthetic biology will be a key com-
ponent of the infrastructure needed to deliver
this (Carlson, 2016). The UK Synthetic Biology
Leadership Council (SBLC) Strategic Plan
(Synthetic Biology Leadership Council, 2016)
focuses attention on the translation of emerging
ideas and commercialisation of applications with
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the target of a £10 billion synthetic biology
based platform in the UK by 2030, building on
maximizing the capability of the innovation pipe-
line, building an expert workforce, developing a
supportive business environment, and building
value from national and international partner-
ships. A diverse, widely distributed and varied
infrastructure will be critical, in the sense of
being essential to the delivery of the expected
benefits from the bioeconomy, and as such wor-
thy of protection. However, the bioeconomy will
subsume many sectors in a nation’s economy
(pharmaceuticals and health care; energy and
transport; agriculture, food and fibre produc-
tion; water and waste management; and poten-
tially electricity generation). Vulnerability to
criminal or terrorist activity is a legitimate con-
cern, but the widely dispersed nature of this
infrastructure (geographically and sectorally) will
put it in a different category from what are cur-
rently considered National Critical Infrastructures
(Lewis et al., 2013). More damage could there-
fore be caused to the bioeconomy by well-
meaning attempts to protect it from threats than
by the threats themselves. Countries are con-
cerned that any loss of competitive edge would
seriously impact their national security, via eco-
nomic opportunity costs and the impeded devel-
opment of specific security applications, such as
developing medical countermeasures to threats
and improving diagnostics (Gronvall, 2015).
Picking the appropriate governance modalities
will require balancing the freedom to innovate
against the security benefits of centralisation
and control (International Risk Governance
Council, 2011).
Discussion
Having completed the iterative process of cull-
ing low-scoring issues as described above, we
found little separating the top 20 issues. To
avoid over-emphasizing slight differences in
score, we chose not to present the top 20 issues
in rank order. The complexity of the field
requires a comprehensive, multi-faceted
approach. Still, some policy- or decision-making
bodies may focus on preparing for distant
futures, and on long-term issues that may other-
wise be overshadowed by current, more press-
ing priorities. Others may focus on nearer term
issues that require immediate attention. Large
science funding bodies tend to consider a
diverse suite of issues spread across a range of
time horizons. To put the top 20 issues in a tem-
poral context, we roughly grouped them
according to their relevance in the near (< 5
years), intermediate (5-10 years), and longer (>
10 years) term. Applications and research with
the potential for near-term impacts on critical
systems, such as global food and fuel supply,
ecosystems, health and geopolitics, thus
appeared in the first category. Those that influ-
ence society indirectly via platforms, ownership
models, markets or future infrastructure, may
have less immediate societal impact and thus
appeared in the latter category.
The top 20 items contain a mixture of social,
environmental, economic and health issues, but
the balance was weighted towards medical inno-
vations and health, with comparatively less
representation of environmental, ecological or
agricultural issues (with the exception of three
topics: ecological risks of gene drives; artificial
photosynthesis for producing fuel; and new
enhanced photosynthesis methods for improving
agricultural productivity). Surprisingly, this imbal-
ance does not reflect the group’s prevailing
areas of application, which were more represen-
tative of food, agriculture and environment than
health and medicine. This outcome may reflect
the relatively high importance society places on
human health and enhancement, and the far
higher level of investment in health sciences. But
just as biological engineering is poised to trans-
form healthcare, it is also appears set to revolu-
tionise these other fields. In the latest horizon
scan for issues likely to impact the future of
global conservation and the environment
(Sutherland et al., 2017), four of the 15 priori-
tised topics were biotechnology applications:
creating fuel from bionic leaves; reverse photo-
synthesis for biofuel production; manipulating
coral symbionts to avoid mass coral bleaching;
and extensive use of bacteria and fungi to man-
age agricultural pests and diseases.
Emerging themes
Bioproduction and its intersection with the infor-
mational and digital aspects of biotechnology
featured heavily in our issues. We raised the
issue of increasingly distributed manufacturing
on pharmaceutical markets, and much discussion
was devoted to security of outsourced biomanu-
facturing, an area flagged as needing more
research and policy, and one that is relatively
underrepresented in the literature. The growth
of the bio-based economy promises sustainabil-
ity and new methods for addressing global envi-
ronmental and societal challenges. Yet, at the
same time, some aspects of the operation of the
bioeconomy present new kinds of security
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challenges. It is not only less centralised than
more established industries, such as petrochemi-
cals, but biological output may also present
more complex, unknown, and large scale haz-
ards than a vat of chemicals: in part because it is
self-replicating and a significant proportion of its
instruction set is digitally encoded in a readable-
writable state. We flagged some challenges this
creates for international agreements such as the
Nagoya Protocol (e.g. controls on physical mate-
rials may be circumvented by synthesising
organisms based on transmission of data
instead). We discussed how this interdepen-
dency with information technology has also set
the stage for new biothreats, with increasing
opportunities to tamper with bio-data, algo-
rithms or automated biofabrication systems. Bio-
logical data is distinct from other cyber security
issues because we are inextricably intertwined
with it; you can easily change your PIN or phone
number, but it is not so easy to change your
DNA. Standardising biological information and
methods for validating, storing and retrieving
data is seen as a starting point for improving
cyber biosecurity, and efforts are being made to
bring standardization into the field through
national agencies (see, for example,
National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy, 2014; British Standards Institution, 2015)
and community initiatives such as the interna-
tional genetically engineered machine (iGEM)
competition for students, which has led the way
in standardisation of biological parts and
descriptions.
Another theme that repeatedly emerged in
our discussion was that of access to the technol-
ogy. Issues around (in)equality were captured in
several of the issues described in this paper. For
example, the rise of open source, off-patent
tools could facilitate widespread sharing of
knowledge within the biological engineering
field and increase access to benefits for those in
developing countries. Translating increased
equity in knowledge exchange and ownership
into economic and sustainable development is
subject to overcoming many existing inequalities
and power structures, but some initiatives are
beginning to bridge this gap, particularly in
healthcare. Society may see the benefits of
affordable medicine as new makers enter health-
care, reducing the monopolies of large, devel-
oped-world pharmaceutical companies,
mediated through patents. On the other hand,
some advances in the field may introduce less
affordable, specialised healthcare as we move
towards regenerative medicine – 3D printing of
body parts, tissue engineering, and genetic
upgrades – and augmenting human genomes,
raising the possibility of new ’sociogenetic’
classes.
A third theme extends from the discussions
around equality, access and benefit sharing: that
is, public trust and acceptance. A number of
issues were discussed that might influence public
acceptance of biotechnology in various ways.
Acceptance may increase with the shift in owner-
ship models described above – away from big
business and towards more open science – and
a more equal distribution of benefits. It may also
increase as technologies advance to target prob-
lems that disproportionately affect the develop-
ing world, such as food security and disease. If
synthetic biology were to be successful in eradi-
cating malaria or Zika, this could bolster public
opinion in favour of genetic engineering (as evi-
denced by the recent open letter of Nobel lau-
reates criticising Greenpeace over its anti-GMO
stance; Agre, 2016). Nonetheless, we note that
in a recent vote in Florida – a non-binding refer-
endum asking residents of Monroe county and
Key West whether they support the release of
genetically engineered mosquitoes to combat
the spread of certain mosquito borne diseases –
only a small majority of voters across the county
supported the use of the technology (57%), and
in the proposed field trial site, a majority
opposed it (65%; Servick, 2016). Having an epi-
demiological end point as a measure of success
of the technology could potentially mark a para-
digm shift in the field, beyond the public accep-
tance yardstick. But then again, proceeding
without the appropriate safety precautions and
societal consensus – whatever the public health
benefits – could damage the field for many years
to come.
Regulatory context
Emerging regulatory challenges that were raised
in the longer list of horizon scanning issues (but
not covered in the 20 issues above) include
questions around the status of innovative prod-
ucts and processes given existing EU regulatory
systems as applied to GMOs, regarded by many
as ‘not fit for purpose’ (Baulcombe, 2014)
(although the EU Opinions on Synthetic Biology
disagreed with this assessment
(Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly
Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR), 2017). The
current EU regulatory system, if applied without
adaptation to synthetic biology and gene editing
techniques, may inhibit the development of
innovations with the potential to deliver societal
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benefits (Tait, 2009), such as the Arsenic Biosen-
sor Collaboration for detecting unsafe arsenic
levels in water wells in affected countries like
India and Bangladesh. The current US regulatory
system has also seen some challenges regarding
the regulatory route to market for new products.
Some crops engineered using programmable
nucleases including CRISPR/Cas9 have fallen
outside the mechanism used by the US Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) to capture a GMO
product within its regulatory system because
they contain small deletions rather than foreign
genetic materials; e.g. non-browning potatoes
and mushrooms (Clasen et al., 2016;
Yang, 2015). Such cases have contributed to
pressures for regulatory systems to be based on
a risk benefit analysis of the final product rather
than the technology used to achieve it
(Camacho et al., 2014).
A broader challenge, also raised in ‘Securing
the critical infrastructure needed to deliver the
bioeconomy’ above, lies in achieving the balance
between regulation and opportunity costs – cau-
tion is necessary to ensure developments are
safe and beneficial, but the regulatory approach
to delivering such safeguards needs to be pro-
portionate to the relevant costs and benefits.
Risks around environmental impact, potential for
weaponization, and narcotic production have
prompted some groups to push for a morato-
rium on some of these technologies
(ETC Group, 2017). If calls to ban certain bio-
technologies are successful, or effective risk miti-
gation strategies are not in place before an
accidental or deliberate adverse event occurs,
we may see policy responses (Morse, 2014) that
impede the delivery of potential benefits. While
none of these tensions are new, the way they
play out will fundamentally influence the future
direction of biological engineering, including the
issues we outline in this paper.
There is a general awareness of the need for
regulatory reform. In July 2015, the White House
issued a memorandum directing the three agen-
cies responsible for overseeing biotechnology
products in the US – the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), and USDA – to update the
existing regulatory framework and "develop a
long-term strategy to ensure that the system is
prepared for the future products of biotechnol-
ogy" (Holdren, 2015). In the EU, there is a dif-
ferent set of concerns about the operation of
regulatory systems, and government policies
focus increasingly on the need for more propor-
tionate and adaptive regulatory systems
(Tait and Banda, 2016). A range of regulatory
adaptations are under way in health care sectors,
for example adaptive pharmaceuticals licensing
advanced by Health Canada and the European
Medicines Agency (Oye, 2012), avoiding a
binary acceptance or rejection of a specific prod-
uct or technology in favour of "stepwise learning
under conditions of acknowledged uncertainty,
with initial limits on use, iterative phases of data
gathering and regulatory evaluation"
(Oye, 2012 p.22).
Many countries and industry sectors now
have policies promoting this approach – for
example, the EU Principle of Proportionality, the
UK accelerated access review, and the OECD
recommendations on regulatory policy and gov-
ernance, potentially marking a sea-change in the
regulatory mind-set, and allowing more timely
access to incremental types of innovation while
still exploring the safe development of more dis-
ruptive innovation (Tait and Banda, 2016). In
the EU, similar approaches may be applied to
current GM regulation and to future regulation
of biological engineering, for example, by
favouring products and processes that can be
monitored, ‘recalled’ or ‘reversed’. However, so
far there has been little movement in this direc-
tion, particularly for applications with potential
environmental impacts, or application in food
and farming industries. The reversibility of a
given genetic technology will depend on its
interplay with biological, ecological and social
environments, and its promise does not neces-
sarily mean it provides the best option to
address the targeted challenge; as we
highlighted in ’New approaches to
synthetic gene drives’ above.
Some comments on the process
There are a number of caveats and considera-
tions in the approach we have taken. The first
concerns the Delphi technique, on which we
based our structured elicitation. Originally devel-
oped for quantitative forecasting, the Delphi
technique has a mixed track record. Its critics
argue that it confuses opinion with systematic
prediction, produces false precision, and imbues
the result with undue confidence (Sack-
man, 1975). If forecasts of precisely defined
events are sought (and if past data is available),
tools such as trend analysis will likely give more
accurate predictions, and could be used in con-
junction with the Delphi method. We seek only
to structure qualitative group judgments about a
broad range of complex futures, for which we
do not have neat datasets to extrapolate.
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Compared with other elicitation approaches,
such as traditional meetings, the Delphi method
has also been found to improve forecasts and
group judgments (Rowe and Wright, 2001). We
believe the method’s benefits transfer to
broader foresight contexts.
Another feature of any group elicitation is
that diverging opinions of individual contribu-
tors can be masked in aggregated scores. Our
analysis of first round data indicates that while
there was considerable diversity in the raw
scores provided by individual participants, the
inter-rater concordance was substantial and sta-
tistically highly significant (Kendall’s W=0.150,
p-value < 10 15). The rank correlation between
individual participants ranged between 0.002
and 0.463, with a median of 0.112 (Spearman’s
rho). Forty-eight of the 210 inter-rater correla-
tions (23%) were statistically significant (Spear-
man correlation p-value < 0.05), further
indicating that while the participants repre-
sented a wide variety of viewpoints, there was
a core of shared opinions. Those who do agree,
agree quite strongly.
Related to this, we do acknowledge that the
issues raised in this paper reflect the people
involved in the process, which is why we explic-
itly encouraged contributors to seek ideas from
beyond their immediate circles, and attempted
to capture a broad array of perspectives and
experience in the core participants. Neverthe-
less, the participants were all UK- or US-based,
and a future scan of this kind would benefit from
including contributors from other parts of the
world, particularly China, a region at the fore-
front of bioengineering, and where unpublished
or locally published research is relatively difficult
to access. Furthermore, our scan more heavily
reflected the views of scholars and innovators
than those of industry (although many partici-
pants had insight into industry through their
consultancies).
We did not include policy makers directly in
our initial scan, as we wished to restrict the size
and composition of the exercise to those at the
exploratory end of research and innovation. Fol-
low-up exercises could, however, involve gov-
ernment representatives to help identify the
most actionable issues. Such an exercise could
utilise an established framework for back-casting
(Holmberg and Robert, 2000), or road map-
ping, or another process for assessing impact
and urgency of the identified issues for their
organisation (Sutherland et al., 2012). Bringing
together a group of policy makers in a follow-up
exercise also encourages the prioritisation of
cross-organizational issues, setting an agenda
for sharing knowledge and developing policy
collaboratively. Ideally, feasibility assessments of
the options available would be included (as car-
ried out in the extension of the recent Antarctic
scan (Kennicutt et al., 2016), outlined in ’Aims’
above). The annual horizon scan of conservation
issues has experienced no shortage of novel
material. We suggest repeating the base scan at
regular intervals, such as biennially.
The issues presented here are not intended
to be exhaustive, nor reflective of what we think
are the most important issues. We stress that a
number of issues did not make the final list
because they were a less appropriate fit with the
aims of the paper, not because they were
deemed less important. Specifically, they may
have been considered (i) too well known or
widely discussed in the bioengineering commu-
nity already (e.g. extreme risks posed by a small
group of people with increased access to resour-
ces and with malicious intent); (ii) too broad (e.g.
adaptive governance as a stand-alone issue)
and/or (iii) too improbable, scientifically chal-
lenging or far-off in the future (e.g. xenobiology,
or engineering neural cells to better interface
with computers). We do recognise that those in
the latter category can make good horizon
issues precisely for the reasons we excluded
them, and a separate process could focus on
this category of issues. But here, we present a
set of issues that we believe are likely to emerge
in the field of biological engineering over the
coming years.
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